Multisensory brain mechanisms of bodily self-consciousness by Blanke, Olaf
Human adults experience a ‘real me’ that ‘resides’ in 
‘my’ body and is the subject (or ‘I’) of experience and 
thought. This aspect of self-consciousness, namely the 
feeling that conscious experiences are bound to the self 
and are experiences of a unitary entity (‘I’), is often con-
sidered to be one of the most astonishing features of the 
human mind.
A powerful approach to investigate self-conscious-
ness has been to target brain mechanisms that process 
bodily signals (that is, bodily self-consciousness)1–6. 
Experimentation with such bodily signals is complex as 
they are continuously present and updated and are con-
veyed by different senses, as well as through motor and 
visceral signals. However, recent developments in video, 
virtual reality and robotics technologies have allowed us 
to investigate the central mechanisms of bodily self-con-
sciousness by providing subjects with ambiguous multi-
sensory information about the location and appearance 
of their own body. This has made it possible to study 
three important aspects of bodily self-consciousness, 
how they relate to the processing of bodily signals and 
which functional and neural mechanisms they may 
share. These three aspects are: self-identification with 
the body (that is, the experience of owning a body), self-
location (that is, the experience of where I am in space) 
and the first-person perspective (that is, the experience 
from where I perceive the world).
This Review describes, for each of these aspects, the 
major experimental paradigms and behavioural find-
ings, neuroimaging and neurological lesion data in 
humans, and electrophysiological studies in non-human 
primates, with the goal to develop a data-driven neuro-
biological model of bodily self-consciousness.
Limb representation and self-consciousness
Many of the recent approaches on bodily self-conscious-
ness can be traced back to findings in patients with focal 
brain damage who had deficits in the processing of bodily 
signals7–14. For example, 70 years ago, neurologist Josef 
Gerstmann15 described two patients with damage to 
the right temporoparietal cortex who experienced loss 
of ownership for their left arm and hand (ownership 
for the right extremities and the rest of their body was 
preserved). This condition is known as somatoparaphre-
nia9,15,16. Such patients most often selectively mis-attribute 
one of their limbs, mostly their contralesional hand, as 
belonging to another person. Another subset of patients 
with somatoparaphrenia may suffer from the opposite 
pattern and self-attribute the hands of other people, when 
these are presented in their contralesional hemispace, as 
belonging to themselves. Recent work has demonstrated 
that the intensity of somatoparaphrenia can be manipu-
lated through various visual, somatosensory and cog-
nitive procedures17,18, and that damage resulting in this 
condition centres on the right posterior insula19.
The rubber hand illusion. Research on body ownership 
was recently spurred by the observation that illusory 
ownership of a fake, dummy, rubber or virtual hand 
can be induced in healthy people20–23. A seminal paper20 
described a simple procedure that uses multisensory 
(in this case, visuotactile) conflicts to induce hand 
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Body ownership
The feeling that the physical 
body and its parts, such as its 
hands and feet, belong to ‘me’ 
and are ‘my’ body.
Multisensory brain mechanisms  
of bodily self-consciousness
Olaf Blanke1,2,3
Abstract | Recent research has linked bodily self-consciousness to the processing and 
integration of multisensory bodily signals in temporoparietal, premotor, posterior parietal 
and extrastriate cortices. Studies in which subjects receive ambiguous multisensory 
information about the location and appearance of their own body have shown that these 
brain areas reflect the conscious experience of identifying with the body (self-identification 
(also known as body-ownership)), the experience of where ‘I’ am in space (self-location) and 
the experience of the position from where ‘I’ perceive the world (first-person perspective). 
Along with phenomena of altered states of self-consciousness in neurological patients and 
electrophysiological data from non-human primates, these findings may form the basis for a 
neurobiological model of bodily self-consciousness.
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Trimodal neurons
Neurons that respond to 
signals from three perceptual 
domains. One type of trimodal 
neuron responds to visual, 
tactile and proprioceptive 
signals; another type of 
trimodal neuron responds to 
visual, tactile and vestibular 
signals.
Proprioceptive signals
Sensory signals about limb and 
body position.
Autoscopic phenomena
A group of illusory own-body 
perceptions during which 
subjects report seeing a 
second own-body in 
extracorporeal space. They 
include autoscopic 
hallucination, heautoscopy  
and out-of-body experiences.
ownership for a rubber or fake hand: the rubber hand 
illusion. Viewing a fake hand being stroked by a paint-
brush in synchrony with strokes applied to one’s own 
corresponding (but occluded) hand can induce the 
illusion that the touch applied to the fake hand is felt 
and also induces illusory ownership for the fake hand 
(FIG. 1a). In addition, participants perceive their hand 
to be at a position that is displaced towards the fake 
hand’s position — a phenomenon known as proprio-
ceptive drift20,23,24. Illusory hand ownership is abolished 
or decreased when the visuotactile stroking is asyn-
chronous20, when an object (rather than a fake hand) 
is stroked23 or when the fake arm is not aligned with21,23 
or is too distant from the participant’s own arm25 (for 
reviews, see REFS 26,27).
Several conceptual models have proposed that illu-
sory hand ownership is caused by visuo–proprioceptive 
integration that is further modulated by tactile stimula-
tion26–28. Although initial work suggested common brain 
mechanisms for illusory hand ownership and proprio-
ceptive drift20, recent findings have suggested that distinct 
multisensory mechanisms underlie the two phenomena. 
In addition, they are modulated by different factors and 
rarely correlate in strength with each other24,28.
Brain areas and multimodal neurons involved in illu-
sory limb ownership. Activation of the bilateral premotor 
cortex (PMC), regions in the intraparietal sulcus (IPS), 
insula and sensorimotor cortex have, in functional MRI 
(fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) stud-
ies, been associated with illusory limb ownership21,29–33 
(FIG. 1b). The cerebellum, insula, supplementary motor 
area, anterior cingulate cortex and posterior parietal cor-
tex, as well as gamma oscillations over the sensorimotor 
cortex31,32, have also been implicated21,29,33–35, whereas 
damage to pathways connecting the PMC, prefron-
tal cortex and parietal cortex results in an inability to 
experience illusory hand ownership36.
Makin and co-workers26 hypothesized that illusory 
hand ownership may involve trimodal neurons in the 
PMC and IPS that integrate tactile, visual and proprio-
ceptive signals; such neurons have been described in 
non-human primates37–44. Indeed, PMC and IPS neurons 
often respond to stimuli applied to the skin of the con-
tralateral arm40–42 and to visual stimuli approaching that 
hand or arm. Importantly, the visual receptive fields of 
these neurons are arm-centred, and their position in the 
visual field depends on proprioceptive signals: their spa-
tial position shifts when the arm position is changed41–43 
(FIG. 1c). It has been proposed that in the rubber hand 
illusion, merely seeing the fake hand or visuotactile 
stimulation of the fake hand and the occluded subject’s 
hand may lead to a shift (or enlargement; see below) of 
the visual receptive fields of IPS and PMC neurons, so 
that they now also encode the position of the fake hand26. 
Such changes in receptive field properties have been 
shown to occur after tool and virtual reality hand use 
(FIG. 1c) in bimodal visuotactile IPS neurons (and prob-
ably in PMC neurons as well) in monkeys42,43 and are 
also compatible with data in humans45–47. Moreover, in 
monkeys, arm-centred trimodal IPS neurons can be 
induced to code for a seen fake arm after synchronous 
stroking of the fake arm and the (occluded) animal’s own 
arm but not after asynchronous stroking48 (FIG. 1d).
Body representation and self-consciousness
The phenomena of somatoparaphrenia and the rubber 
hand illusion are important for studying limb owner-
ship and perceived limb position. However, they do not 
enable us to investigate fundamental aspects of self-
consciousness that are related to the global and unitary 
character of the self. That is, the self is normally expe-
rienced as a single representation of the entire, spatially 
situated body rather than as a collection of several differ-
ent body parts1. Indeed, patients with somatoparaphre-
nia and healthy subjects with illusory hand ownership 
still experience normal self-location, normal first-per-
son perspective and normal self-identification with the 
rest of their body. These three crucial aspects of bodily 
self-consciousness also remain normal in many other 
interesting research paradigms and clinical conditions 
that alter ownership of fingers49,50, feet (in patients with 
somatoparaphrenia), half-bodies12,51,52 or faces53,54.
Investigations of patients suffering from a distinct 
group of neurological conditions have revealed that self-
identification, self-location and first-person perspective 
can be altered in so-called autoscopic phenomena51,55–57. 
These phenomena have directly inspired the develop-
ment of experimental procedures — using video, virtual 
reality and/or robotic devices — that induce changes in 
self-location, self-identification and first-person per-
spective in healthy subjects58–60. The subjects experience 
illusions, referred to as out-of-body illusions or full- 
body illusions, that arise from visuotactile and visuo-
vestibular conflicts. In such studies, the tactile stroking 
stimulus is applied to the back or chest of a participant 
who is being filmed and simultaneously views (through a 
head-mounted display (HMD)) the stroking of a human 
body in a real-time film or virtual reality animation (FIG. 2).
Experimental approaches. One approach involved par-
ticipants viewing a three-dimensional video image on an 
HMD that was linked to a video camera that was placed 
2 m behind the person, filming the participant’s back 
from behind (FIG. 2a). Participants thus saw their body 
from an ‘outside’, third-person perspective. In one study 
using this approach60, subjects viewed the video image 
of their body (the ‘virtual body’) while an experimenter 
stroked their back with a stick. The stroking was thus felt 
by the participants on their back and also seen on the 
back of the virtual body. The HMD displayed the strok-
ing of the virtual body either in real-time or not (using 
an online video-delay or offline pre-recorded data), 
generating synchronous and asynchronous visuotactile 
stimulation.
In another study58, seated subjects wearing two 
HMDs viewed a video of their own body, which was 
being filmed by two cameras placed 2 m behind their 
body. Here, the experimenter stroked the subject on the 
chest with a stick and moved a similar stick just below 
the camera. The stroking was thus felt by the subject and 
seen when not occluded by the virtual body (FIG. 2b).
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Figure 1 | Illusory hand ownership. a | Experimental set-up of the rubber hand illusion. Participants see a rubber or fake 
hand (centre) at a plausible distance and orientation from their hand (left), which is hidden from view. Synchronous 
stroking of both hands (at corresponding locations and with the same speed) leads to the illusion that the touch is felt on 
the seen rubber hand, accompanied by a feeling of ownership for the rubber hand and a change in perceived hand 
position towards the rubber hand (a phenomenon known as proprioceptive drift). Asynchronous stroking, implausible 
location and incongruent orientation of the rubber hand with respect to the participant’s hand abolish the illusion.  
b | The main brain regions that are associated with illusory hand ownership and changes in perceived hand position. 
Regions include the ventral and dorsal premotor cortex (PMC), primary somatosensory cortex (S1), intraparietal sulcus 
(IPS), insula, anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and the cerebellum. c | Receptive fields of bimodal neurons in the IPS region 
of macaque monkeys that respond to tactile and visual stimulation. The left panel shows the tactile receptive field (tRF; 
blue) and the visual receptive field (vRF; pink) of a bimodal (visuotactile) neuron that responds to touches applied to the 
indicated skin region and to visual stimuli presented in the indicated region of visual space surrounding the arm and hand. 
The size of the vRFs can be extended to more distant locations through tool use (middle panel). Similar extensions of vRFs 
have been observed when vision of the hand and arm is not mediated by direct sight but mediated via video recordings 
(right panel). d | Trimodal neurons in the IPS region of macaque monkeys respond to visual, proprioceptive and tactile 
stimulation. For such neurons, the position of the visual receptive field remains fixed to the position of the arm across 
several different postures and is based on proprioceptive signals about limb position. The left panel shows an experimental 
set-up (with the hidden arm positioned below the fake arm) that has been used to reveal that such neurons also respond to 
tactile and visuotactile stimulation. The activity of such neurons can be altered by visuotactile stroking applied to the fake 
hand and the hidden hand of the animal. Before visuotactile stroking, the neuron showed greater firing when the real arm 
was positioned to the left than when it was positioned to the right, but the position of the fake arm did not affect its firing 
rate (middle panel). After synchronous stroking, but not asynchronous stroking (not shown), the neuron was sensitive to 
the position of both the real arm and the fake arm (right panel). This suggests that such trimodal neurons can learn to 
encode the fake arm’s position. Part c is modified, with permission, from REF. 43 © (2004) Elsevier and REF. 214 © (2001) 
Elsevier. Part d is modified, with permission, from REF. 48 © (2000) American Association for the Advancement of Science.
R E V I E W S
558 | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION  www.nature.com/reviews/neuro
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
A third study61 involved subjects in a supine body 
position. Their bodies were filmed by a camera placed 
2 m above the subject so that the virtual body, seen on an 
HMD, appeared to be located below the physical body. 
Here, the subjects received both back and chest stroking 
(although not simultaneously) and saw the virtual body 
receiving the same type of stroking.
Studies using these types of set-ups to target self-
identification, self-location and the first-person perspec-
tive are the focus of the following sections.
Self-identification
Experimentally induced changes in self-identification. 
In the study in which subjects viewed the video image 
of their body while an experimenter stroked their back 
with a stick60 (FIG. 2a), illusory self-identification with the 
virtual body and referral of touch were stronger during 
synchronous than during asynchronous stroking60, simi-
lar to the rubber hand illusion20. In the second study58, in 
which seated subjects were stroked on the chest (FIG. 2b) 
while they viewed their body from behind, the sub-
jects also reported referral of touch (the feeling that the 
stick they saw was touching their real chest). They also 
reported that during synchronous stroking, looking at 
the virtual body was like viewing the body of someone 
else (that is, they had low self-identification with the 
virtual body). In the third study61, subjects in a supine 
position saw their virtual body (on an HMD), which 
appeared to be located below the physical body. Here, 
self-identification with and referral of touch to the vir-
tual body were greater during synchronous than during 
asynchronous back stroking. By contrast, self-identifi-
cation with the virtual body was lower during synchro-
nous chest stroking as compared to asynchronous 
chest stroking.
Unlike older studies62–66 (FIG. 2c), these recent studies 
have the advantage that self-identification can be tested 
experimentally across well-controlled conditions of 
visuotactile stimulation while keeping motor and ves-
tibular factors constant. It has also been shown that 
illusory full-body self-identification is associated with 
an interference of visual stimuli on the perception of tac-
tile stimuli67,68 (FIG. 2d). Such visuotactile interference is a 
behavioural index of whether visual and tactile stimuli 
are functionally perceived to be in the same spatial loca-
tion67,69–72. These findings suggest that during illusory 
self-identification, visual stimuli seen at a position that 
is 2 m in front of the subject’s back, and tactile stimuli 
that were applied on the subject’s back were function-
ally perceived to be in the same spatial location (also see 
REFS 67,69–74).
Illusory self-identification with a virtual body is also 
associated with physiological and nociceptive changes. 
Thus, the skin conductance response to a threat directed 
towards the virtual body44,58,75 as well as pain thresholds 
(for stimuli applied to the body of the participant during 
the full-body illusion)76 are increased in states of illusory 
self-identification. The changes in touch, pain perception 
and physiology that occur during illusory self-identifica-
tion indicate that states of illusory self-identification alter 
the way humans process stimuli from their body.
Activity in cortical areas reflects self-identification. 
Three imaging studies on self-identification have been 
carried out to date. They all manipulated self-identifi-
cation through visuotactile stimulation, although they 
differed greatly in terms of the experimental set-up. 
One comprehensive fMRI study44 of a full-body illusion 
reported that self-identification with a virtual body is 
associated with activity in the bilateral ventral PMC, left 
IPS and left putamen (FIG. 3a). The activity in these three 
regions was enhanced by visuotactile stimulation when 
the virtual body was seen in the same place as the par-
ticipant’s body (from a first-person viewpoint and not 
in back-view; see below). Activity in these regions was 
also enhanced when visuotactile stimulation was applied 
to the virtual hand and the subject’s corresponding 
(hidden) hand44.
An electroencephalography (EEG) study77 linked 
self-identification with a virtual body to activity in 
bilateral medial sensorimotor cortices and medial 
PMC (FIG. 3a). Specifically, self-identification (and self-
location) with a virtual body induced by synchronous 
versus asynchronous visuotactile stimulation of the 
real and the virtual body was associated with differen-
tial suppression of alpha band power (8–13 Hz) oscil-
lations in bilateral medial sensorimotor regions and 
the medial PMC77. These changes in alpha band sup-
pression between synchronous versus asynchronous 
stimulation conditions were absent if a virtual control 
object was used instead of a virtual body. Alpha band 
oscillations over central areas (that is, the mu rhythm) 
have been linked to sensorimotor processing78, and mu 
rhythm suppression is thought to reflect increased cor-
tical activation in sensorimotor and/or premotor cor-
tices79. Indeed, movements, movement observation80, 
motor imagery81 and biological motion perception82 
suppress mu oscillations in the sensorimotor cortex, as 
do the application of tactile cues83 and the observation 
of touch applied to another person84. These EEG data 
thus suggest increased activation of the sensorimotor 
cortex and PMC during asynchronous, as compared to 
synchronous, visuotactile stimulation. This is similar 
to findings from a PET study of illusory hand own-
ership33 but opposite to the increased BOLD (blood-
oxygen-level-dependent) activity found during the 
synchronous stroking condition in the fMRI study44.
A second fMRI study59 found that self-identification 
with a virtual body is associated with activation in the 
right middle–inferior temporal cortex (partially overlap-
ping with the extrastriate body area (EBA)) (FIG. 3a). The 
EBA is, like the PMC and IPS, involved in the processing 
of human bodies85–88. More work is needed as only three 
neuroimaging studies have been carried out to date, and 
the results and the applied methods vary greatly.
Self-identification and multisensory integration. The 
bilateral PMC, IPS and sensorimotor cortex have also 
been associated with illusory limb ownership, sug-
gesting that full-body and body-part ownership may, 
at least partly, recruit similar visuotactile mechanisms 
and similar brain regions44. Findings from non-human 
primates suggest that self-identification for an arm and 
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Figure 2 | Set-ups of illusory self-identification experiments. a | Experimental set-up during the full-body illusion 
using back stroking60. A participant (light colour) views, on video goggles, a camera recording of his own back, as if a 
virtual body (dark colour) were located a few metres in front. An experimenter administers tactil  stroking to the 
participant’s back (stroking stick; red colour), which the participant sees on the video goggles as visual stroking on the 
virtual body. Synchrony (real-time projection) but not asynchrony (pre-recorded or delayed projection) of visuotactile 
stroking results in illusory self-identification with the virtual body. b | Experimental set-up during the full-body illusion 
using chest-stroking58. An experimenter applies simultaneously tactile strokes (unseen by the participant) to the chest 
of the participant (light colour) and visual strokes in front of the camera, which films the seated participant from a 
posterior position. On the video goggles, the participant sees a recording of the own body, including the visual 
strokes, from the posterior camera position. Synchronous (real-time video projection) but not asynchronous (delayed 
video projection) visuotactile stroking results in illusory self-identification with the camera viewpoint (represented by 
the body in the dark colour). c | An early experimental set-up using a portable mirror device is shown, in which several 
aspects of bodily self-consciousness, likely including self-identification, were manipulated. Four portable mirrors 
(A–D) were aligned around a participant (standing position) in such a way that the participant could see in front of 
him a visual projection of his body in a horizontal position. d | The experimental set-up of a full-body illusion using 
back stroking (a) has also been used to acquire repeated behavioural measurements related to visuotactile perception 
(that is, the crossmodal congruency effect (CCE))68. In addition to the visuotactile stroking (as in a) participants wore 
vibrotactile devices and saw visual stimuli (light-emitting diodes) on their back while viewing their body through 
video goggles. The CCE is a behavioural measure that indicates whether a visual and a touch stimulus are perceived to 
be at identical spatial locations. Participants were asked to indicate where they perceived a single-touch stimulus 
(that is, a short vibration), which was applied either just below the shoulder or on the lower back. Distracting visual 
stimuli (that is, short light flashes) were also presented on the back either at the same or at a different position (and 
were filmed by the camera). Under these conditions, participants were faster to detect a touch stimulus if the visual 
distractor was presented at the same location (that is, a congruent trial) compared to touches co-presented with a 
more distanced visual distractor (that is, an incongruent trial). CCE measurements were carried out while illusory self-
identification was modulated by visuotactile stroking as described in part a. The effect of congruency on reaction 
times was larger during synchronous visuotactile stroking than during asynchronous stroking, indicating greater 
interference of irrelevant visual stimuli during illusory self-identification with the virtual body. Part c is modified, with 
permission, from REF. 65 © (1899) Oxford University Press.
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for a full-body both rely on visuotactile neurons. For 
example, the PMC and IPS in non-human primates 
harbour bimodal neurons that are involved in inte-
gration of visual and somatosensory stimuli regard-
ing the arms and the trunk38,41,43,48. Thus, in addition 
to arm-centred neurons (see above), these regions 
harbour trunk-centred neurons that have large recep-
tive fields43 (FIG. 3b): that is, they encode the surface 
of the trunk38,89,90 and, in some cases, the whole body of 
the monkey89. On the basis of the involvement of the 
IPS and PMC in humans in both hand ownership and 
self-identification (that is, body ownership) and the 
properties of bimodal visuotactile neurons in these 
regions in monkeys, it can be speculated that changes in 
full-body self-identification may be a result of stroking- 
induced changes in the size and position of trunk- 
centred bimodal neurons with respect to the vir-
tual body that is seen on the HMD. In this scenario, 
the visual receptive fields of such bimodal neurons 
would be enlarged following visuotactile stroking, 
and would also encode the more distant position of the 
seen virtual body after stroking43 (FIG. 3c).
However, there are also some important differences 
between full-body and body-part ownership. For exam-
ple, during the full-body illusion, there is self-identifi-
cation with a virtual body that is viewed at a distance 
of 2 m, whereas in the rubber hand illusion, the illu-
sion decreases or disappears when the rubber hand is 
placed at more distant positions25 or when the posture 
of the rubber hand is changed to an implausible one23. 
Considering that viewing one’s body from an external 
perspective at 2 m distance is even less anatomically 
Figure 3 | Brain mechanisms of illusory self-identifica-
tion. a | The drawing shows the different brain regions that 
have been implicated in illusory self-identification. Regions 
include the ventral premotor cortex (vPMC), primary 
somatosensory cortex (S1), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), 
extrastriate body area (EBA) and the putamen (not shown). 
Data by Petkova et al.44 are shown in red, by Lenggenhager 
et al.77 in blue and by Ionta et al.59 in yellow. The location of 
brain damage leading to heautoscopy is also shown98 (green). 
b | Receptive fields of bimodal neurons in area VIP (ventral 
intraparietal) of macaque monkeys that respond to both 
tactile and visual stimulation. In both panels, the size and 
position of the tactile receptive field (tRF) is indicated in blue 
and the size and position of the visual receptive field (vRF) in 
peripersonal space is indicated in pink. A neuron in area VIP 
responds to tactile stimuli applied to a large skin region 
encompassing the right shoulder, right arm and right half of 
the head, and to visual stimuli from the large visual region 
indicated in pink (left panel). Other neurons in area VIP 
respond to tactile stimuli applied to the entire trunk and the 
right arm (tRF; blue)90 and visual stimuli in the upper bilateral 
visual fields (vRF; pink) (right panel). Other neurons (not 
shown) respond to tactile stimuli applied to the right 
hemibody and visual stimuli from the entire right visual field 
(vRF). Note the congruence of the size and location of vRFs 
and tRFs for each neuron and the larger size of the RFs with 
respect to arm- or hand-centred bimodal neurons depicted 
in FIG. 1c. Neurons with similar properties have also been 
described in area 5 and the PMC. c | Hypothetical changes in 
the size and/or position of the vRF of trunk-centred bimodal 
VIP neurons that may be associated with illusory self-identifi-
cation during the full-body illusion as induced by visuotactile 
stroking between the participant’s body (light-coloured body) 
and the filmed (dark-coloured) body (also see FIG. 2a). The left 
panel shows the bilateral vRF (in pink) of a bimodal visuotactile 
neuron that responds to stimuli that are seen as approaching 
the person’s arms, trunk and the back of the head (location of 
tRFs not shown). During the full-body illusion, the sight of 
one’s own body filmed from behind and viewed through a 
head-mounted display may alter the size and/or position of 
the vRFs of such trunk-centred visuotactile neurons, so that 
they now extend to the more distant position of the seen 
filmed body (right panel). Such vRF changes in the full-body 
illusion may be particularly prominent under conditions of 
synchronous visuotactile stroking applied to the filmed back 
and the hidden back of the subject, as shown for visuotactile 
stroking between a participant’s hidden hand and a fake hand48.
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Heautoscopy
The phenomenon in which the 
subject experiences seeing a 
second own-body in 
extracorporeal space. Subjects 
often report strong self-identifi-
cation with the second 
own-body and heautoscopy is 
often associated with the 
sensation of bi-location (that is, 
the sensation of being at two 
places at the same time).
plausible than a fake hand in a misaligned posture, it is 
perhaps surprising that the full-body illusion occurs at 
all under such conditions (but see REF. 91). I argue that 
further differences between trunk- versus arm-centred 
neurons may account for this. Thus, in monkeys, the 
visual receptive fields of bimodal neurons with tactile 
receptive fields that are centred on the trunk (including 
the back and shoulder) in area 5 (REF. 43) and area VIP 
(ventral intraparietal)90 in the parietal cortex are larger 
than those of neurons with hand-centred visual and 
tactile receptive fields (FIG. 3b). Moreover, the visual 
receptive fields of trunk-centred visuotactile neurons 
sometimes extend for 1 m or more into extrapersonal 
space43, whereas the visual receptive fields of arm- 
centred visuotactile neurons extend less far42,43 (for 
trunk-centred bilateral neurons in area 5, see REFS 92,93).
Thus, although arm and full-body ownership are 
both associated with visuotactile mechanisms in the 
sense that the neurons involved respond to both visual 
and tactile stimuli and depend on the temporal congru-
ency between seen and felt stimulation, they probably 
rely on at least partly different mechanisms, as trunk- 
and hand-centred visuotactile neurons differ in the 
location and the size of their visual and tactile receptive 
fields38,40–43,48,92. In addition, trunk- versus hand-centred 
visuotactile neurons are likely to be found within differ-
ent subregions involved in visuotactile integration (their 
location differs, for example, in area 5, although this 
has so far only been described for tactile neurons92,93). 
Moreover, area VIP has more visuotactile trunk- and 
head-coding cells than hand-coding cells, whereas the 
opposite is true for more anterior areas in the IPS94 and 
area 5. Although visuotactile neurons have not been 
defined in the EBA59, it can be speculated that the cel-
lular mechanisms for self-identification in the EBA are 
similar because activity in this region is modulated by 
movements of the observer85 as well as during tactile 
explorations of body-shaped objects95,96.
Neurologically induced changes in self-identification. 
Patients with heautoscopy1,97 report strong changes 
in self-identification with a hallucinated visual body. 
These patients report seeing a second own-body in 
extrapersonal space and often self-identify and expe-
rience a close affinity with this autoscopic body56,97,98. 
Self-identification with the hallucinated body may even 
persist if the hallucinated body only partly reflects the 
patient’s outside bodily appearance97,98, which is compat-
ible with illusory self-identification that can be induced 
with avatars and fake bodies that do not resemble the 
body of the participant44,59,60,75. Heautoscopy is associ-
ated with vestibular sensations and detachment from 
emotional and bodily processing from the physical body, 
suggesting links with depersonalization disorder97,99. It 
has been proposed that heautoscopy is a disorder of mul-
tisensory (in this case, visual, tactile and proprioceptive) 
integration of bodily signals and an additional disinte-
gration of such cues with vestibular signals100. Patients 
with heautoscopy do not just report abnormalities in 
self-identification but also in self-location (see below). 
To the question ‘‘where am I in space?” they cannot 
provide a clear answer, and self-location may frequently 
alternate between different embodied and extrapersonal 
positions and may even be experienced at two positions 
simultaneously14,97,100,101. This experience may sometimes 
be described as if being “split in two parts or selves”, as 
if “I were two persons” (REF. 102) or as having a “split 
personality” (REF. 103). Although the precise location 
of brain lesions that induce heautoscopy has not yet 
been identified, a recent review suggests a predominant 
involvement of the left temporoparietal cortex and to a 
lesser extent the occipitotemporal cortex98 (FIG. 3a).
Collectively, the data reviewed above suggest that 
self-identification is linked to activity in five cortical 
regions — the IPS, PMC, sensorimotor cortex, EBA and 
temporoparietal cortex — and probably also in subcorti-
cal structures like the putamen. The EBA, sensorimotor 
cortex and temporoparietal cortex were less consistently 
observed across the reviewed data, suggesting that IPS 
and PMC processing is most important. These five cor-
tical areas are known to integrate multisensory bodily 
signals — including visual, somatosensory and vestibu-
lar signals38,41–43,90,104 — and all except the EBA and sen-
sorimotor cortex have been shown to harbour bimodal 
(or multimodal) neurons (for multimodal neurons in the 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), see next section) that 
have large receptive fields encompassing the trunk and 
face region and, in some cases, the legs. Experimentally 
induced changes in illusory self-identification with a 
fake or virtual body via video-based virtual reality sys-
tems may be associated with a stroking-induced enlarge-
ment or alteration of the visual receptive fields of such 
bimodal neurons (FIG. 3c) in these five areas (especially 
the IPS and PMC), although no direct evidence for 
this possibility exists yet. More neuroimaging work in 
humans is necessary to better understand the different 
activation patterns across studies and how they relate 
to differences in visuotactile stimulation paradigms and 
self-identification.
Self-location and first-person perspective
Under normal conditions, in the described laboratory 
conditions, and in most reports by neurological patients, 
the position of self-location and the first-person per-
spective coincide, and changes in self-location and first-
person perspective are therefore described together here. 
In rare instances, however, self-location and first-person 
perspective can be experienced at different positions105, 
suggesting that it may be possible to experimentally 
induce similar dissociations in healthy subjects.
Experimentally induced changes in self-location and 
first-person perspective. Attempts to study self-location 
in healthy individuals through self-reports106,107, inter-
views, pointing108 and schematic drawings109 found that 
most participants indicated self-location within their 
body, particularly in the head. Can alterations in self-
location be induced experimentally? Stratton reported 
heautoscopy-like changes in self-location as early as 
1899 (REF. 65) (FIG. 2c). In an observational study63, the 
authors installed a fixed camera in the corner of a room 
and projected the filmed scene (including the subject’s 
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body) onto their subject’s HMD so that they could see 
their body from a distance while walking. Using such 
sensorimotor cues, subjects reported being both at the 
position of the camera and at the position at which they 
saw their body. More recently, researchers have induced 
alterations in self-location by employing the techniques 
that are used to study self-identification, which are 
described above (FIG. 2). Results from these studies58,60 
indicated that during the illusion, subjects experienced 
self-location (measured by questionnaires58, walking 
responses60 or mental imagery59,61) not at the position 
of their physical body but either ‘in front of ’ or ‘behind’ 
that position, depending on whether the actual and 
virtual body received synchronous back stroking60 or 
chest stroking58. Comparable changes in self-location 
occurred when subjects were in supine position61 
(FIG. 4a, left panel).
In a recent fMRI study59, participants in a supine 
position viewed, through video goggles, short movies 
showing a back view of a virtual body that was filmed 
from an elevated position (that is, by a camera positioned 
above the virtual body). The participant received back 
strokes (robotic stroking) while viewing the video, and 
these were either synchronous or asynchronous with the 
back strokes that the virtual body received on the video. 
Subjects reported higher self-location towards the virtual 
body during the synchronous compared with the asyn-
chronous stroking condition (FIG. 4a). Participants were 
also asked to indicate the experienced direction of their 
first-person perspective (either upwards or downwards). 
Interestingly, despite identical visuotactile stimulation, 
half of the participants experienced looking upward 
towards the virtual body (up-group) and half experi-
enced looking down on the virtual body (down-group). 
Importantly, these changes in first-person perspective 
were associated with different changes in self-location 
in both groups: up-group participants reported an ini-
tially low position of self-location and an elevation in 
self-location during synchronous stroking, whereas 
participants from the down-group reported the oppo-
site (FIG. 4a). Moreover, subjective reports of elevated 
self-location and sensations of flying, floating, rising, 
lightness and being far from the physical body were 
frequent in the down-group and rare in the up-group59. 
These data show, first, that self-location depends on 
visuotactile stimulation and on the experienced direc-
tion of the first-person perspective. Second, these data 
suggest that different multisensory mechanisms underlie 
self-location versus self-identification, as the latter does 
not depend on the first-person perspective59. Different 
multisensory mechanisms have also been described 
for illusory hand ownership and perceived hand loca-
tion in the rubber hand illusion paradigm28,30, which 
can be compared with illusory self-identification and 
self-location, respectively.
It is currently not known whether and how these expe-
riences of self-location and the first-person perspective 
relate to those in earlier studies on the visual, auditory 
and kinesthetic ego-centre and to subjective reports based 
on interviews and pointing108,109. It should be of interest 
to test whether the visual ego-centre110 can be altered 
through visuotactile stimulation and, if so, whether such 
changes are body-specific and depend on visuotactile 
synchrony. Self-location and the first-person perspec-
tive as manipulated through visuotactile stimulation 
may also relate to brain mechanisms of prism adaptation. 
Prism adaptation is generally studied by inserting 
Figure 4 | Illusory self-location and first-person perspective. a | Self-location and 
first-person perspective depend on visuotactile signals and their integration with 
vestibular signals. The left panel shows a participant lying horizontally on her back (pink 
body) and receiving back stroking from a robotic stimulator (not shown) installed on the 
bed. While she receives such tactile stimulation, she is watching (on video goggles) a 
video of another person receiving the back stroking (body not shown). Under this 
visuotactile condition, one group of participants experienced looking upward (upward 
first-person perspective) associated with elevated self-location, and this experience was 
stronger during synchronous stroking (left panel, dark body) than during asynchronous 
stroking condition (left panel, beige body). Another group of participants, who received 
physically identical visuotactile stimulation conditions, experienced looking downward 
associated with lower self-location, and this experience was also stronger during 
synchronous stroking (right panel, dark body) than during asynchronous stroking (right 
panel, beige body). These differences in self-location and experienced direction of the 
first-person perspective are probably due to different weighing of visual and vestibular 
cues related to gravity perception. Thus, the visual cues from the posture of the filmed 
body suggested that the direction of gravity is upward, while the veridical direction of 
gravity is always downwards. Participants in the left panel seem to rely more strongly on 
vestibular versus visual cues, whereas the opposite is true for participants depicted in the 
right panel, when judging self-location and the direction of the first-person perspective. 
The direction of the experienced direction of the first-person perspective is indicated by 
an arrow in both panels. b | The drawing shows the different brain regions that were 
activated during illusory self-location and changes in the first-person perspective in 
different studies. Regions include the right and left posterior superior temporal gyrus 
(pSTG), right temporoparietal junction (TPJ), primary somatosensory cortex (S1) and 
medial premotor cortex (mPMC) and adjacent medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Data by 
Lenggenhager et al.77 are shown in blue, data by Ionta et al.59 are shown in yellow and the 
location of brain damage at the right angular gyrus that leads to out-of-body experiences 
is shown in green59.
Ego-centre
A single point from which 
human observers believe they 
are viewing a spatial scene. 
Ego-centres have been 
investigated for visual, auditory 
or kinaesthetic stimuli.
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systematic spatial mismatches between the seen position 
of visual cues and their actual spatial coordinates111–115. 
The recent experiments on self-location and the first-
person perspective described above may thus be con-
ceived as a form of prism adaptation that uses a complex 
displacement of the visuospatial field and the position of 
the observer within it. Future research should investigate 
whether experimentally induced changes in self-location 
and first-person perspective rely on similar mechanisms 
to those described for prism adaptation111–115.
Activity in bilateral temporoparietal cortex reflects self-
location and first-person perspective. In an EEG study77, 
modulation of self-location was associated with 8–13 Hz 
oscillatory activity in bilateral medial sensorimotor and 
medial PMC (FIG. 4b). In addition, gamma band power 
in the right TPJ and alpha band power in the medial 
prefrontal cortex correlated with the strength of the 
induced changes in illusory self-location. An fMRI study 
also showed an association between changes in self-
location and first-person perspective and activity at the 
TPJ bilaterally59. Here, TPJ activity, which peaked in the 
left and right posterior superior temporal gyrus (pSTG), 
differed between synchronous and asynchronous strok-
ing conditions (FIG. 4b), and, importantly, depended on 
the experienced direction of the first-person perspec-
tive59. Thus, in one group of subjects, pSTG activity was 
higher in the asynchronous stroking condition, whereas 
in another group of subjects pSTG activity was higher in 
the synchronous stroking condition — that is, the 
BOLD response was smaller during conditions in which 
subjects from either group experienced an elevated 
self-location59. The finding in this fMRI study that self-
location depended on the first-person perspective shows 
that the matching of different sensory inputs alone does 
not account for pSTG activity in healthy subjects.
Neurologically induced changes in self-location and 
first-person perspective. The involvement of the pSTG 
in self-location and the first-person perspective is con-
sistent with out-of-body experiences (OBEs) in patients 
with damage to the pSTG. These patients experience a 
change in both self-location and first-person perspective 
— they see and/or feel their body and the world from 
an elevated perspective that does not coincide with the 
physical position of their body98,100,116. Although this 
first-person perspective is illusory, it is experienced 
in the same way as humans experience their everyday 
first-person perspective under normal conditions117–119. 
This phenomenon has been induced experimentally in a 
patient with epilepsy who experienced OBEs120 that were 
characterized by elevated self-location and a downward-
looking first-person perspective by applying 2 s periods 
of electrical stimulation at the anterior part of the right 
angular gyrus and the pSTG. For 2 s periods, this patient 
experienced the sensation of being under the ceiling and 
seeing the entire visual scene (including the room, her 
body and other people) from her stimulation-induced 
elevated first-person perspective and self-location. The 
findings from the experiment using robotic stroking59 
described above are intriguing in this respect, as they 
showed that under certain experimental conditions, 
healthy subjects can experience a 180° inversion and 
displacement of the first-person perspective similar to 
the perspective changes seen in patients with OBEs. 
On the basis of other hallucinations that are associated 
with OBEs — including vestibular otolithic sensations 
(such as floating, flying and elevation) and visuotactile 
hallucinations100,105,120–122 — it has been proposed98 that 
OBEs are caused by abnormal integration of tactile, pro-
prioceptive, visual and in particular vestibular inputs. 
Anatomically, OBEs resulting from focal brain damage 
or electrical brain stimulation have been associated with 
many different brain structures100,120,123,124 but most often 
involve the right angular gyrus59 (FIG. 4b).
Viewpoint changes and spatial navigation. The search 
for the brain mechanisms underlying the first-person 
perspective and its relation to other aspects of self-con-
sciousness has been approached from many different 
angles (see below)98,125. However, these studies focused 
on imagined or visual changes in the first-person per-
spective versus third-person viewpoints that differ from 
the changes in the experienced direction of the first-
person perspective described above in neurological and 
healthy subjects. For example, some experiments have 
studied self-identification by changing the viewpoint 
from which a virtual body was shown. Thus, one study 
tested whether participants experienced differences in 
self-identification depending on whether they saw a vir-
tual body from a first- versus third-person viewpoint126 
(also see REF. 75). In the first-person viewpoint condi-
tion, participants tilted their heads down as if to look 
towards their stomach while being shown the stomach 
and legs of a virtual body on an HMD. In the third-
person viewpoint condition, participants were asked to 
look straight ahead and saw a front-facing virtual body 
at a short distance. The participants reported higher 
self-identification for first- versus third-person view-
points126 (also see REF. 127). Higher self-identification 
with a virtual body was also reported by supine subjects 
who received stroking and simultaneously watched syn-
chronous (as compared to asynchronous) stroking being 
applied to a virtual body that was seen as if in the same 
place as their own physical body (first-person view-
point)44. Activity the in left and right PMC and in the 
left IPS was increased in conditions with higher levels of 
self-identification44. Findings from a study in which par-
ticipants observed and interacted with virtual humans, 
virtual mirrors and other virtual objects127 confirmed the 
importance of the first-person viewpoint for the strength 
of self-identification with a virtual body, but also showed 
that under the first-person viewpoint visuotactile stimu-
lation did not strongly alter self-identification, whereas 
it did for third-person viewpoints. Together, these 
data show that different visual viewpoints of a virtual 
body induce different levels of self-identification and 
that these may126 or may not127 depend on visuotactile 
conflict.
These studies echo recent work that compared differ-
ent types of ‘egocentric’ viewpoint transformations and 
judgements. In several experiments, subjects watched a 
Prism adaptation
The phenomenon that subjects 
who wear prism glasses that 
introduce spatial mismatches 
between the seen position of 
visual cues and their actual 
spatial coordinates learn to 
correctly perceive and reach 
for visual targets.
Out-of-body experience
(OBE). The phenomenon in 
which the subject experiences 
seeing a second own-body 
from an elevated and 
distanced extracorporeal 
position. Subjects often report 
disembodiment (that is, a 
sensation of separation from 
their physical body) and 
sensations of flying and 
lightness.
Virtual mirrors
Part of an immersive virtual 
reality scenario that includes a 
region where the image and 
movements of the immersed 
user will be simulated as if 
reflected from a physical 
mirror.
Egocentric
An umbrella term for maps 
and/or patterns of modulation 
that can be defined in relation 
to some point on the observer 
(for example, head- or 
eye-centred maps).
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virtual scene showing an avatar in the centre and a dif-
ferent number of red balls around her128–130. The subjects 
observed the scene from different viewpoints (including 
that of the avatar and different red ball positions) and 
had to either imagine how many balls the avatar could 
‘see’ (that is, an imagined third-person viewpoint) or 
how many balls they were seeing (that is, a first-person 
viewpoint).The third-person viewpoint condition was 
associated with activation in the superior parietal lobule 
and premotor regions, whereas the first-person view-
point condition activated the prefrontal cortex, medial 
posterior parietal cortex and bilateral STG. In a related 
experiment, frequent viewpoint changes (as compared to 
a fixed viewpoint) were associated with right TPJ activa-
tion (centring on the posterior middle temporal gyrus)131 
(also see REF. 128). The areas of the brain in which activ-
ity changes during different first-person viewpoints may 
be of relevance for recognizing landmarks and during 
spatial navigation132. For example, a network of brain 
regions consisting of the right TPJ, IPS, precuneus and 
parahippocampal gyrus133 is activated when subjects 
imagine looking at a spatial environment from a number 
of different (that is, imagined third-person) viewpoints. 
Moreover, these brain regions are different from those 
involved in allocentric scene transformations134 (BOX 1).
Vestibular processing and the first-person perspective. 
The studies discussed above44,126 involved changes in 
viewpoint: that is, changes in the visual input to the brain 
while testing bodily self-consciousness. Importantly, 
this is different from the situation in patients with OBEs 
and in experiments involving robotically applied strok-
ing59, who experience changes in first-person perspec-
tive without any changes in the actual visual input. This 
suggests that the first-person perspective may have a 
non-visual, vestibular component, and that the first-
person perspective therefore relies, at least partly, on 
distinct brain mechanisms from those involved in self-
identification, which rely on visual and somatosensory 
input. It has been argued59 that mechanisms underly-
ing the first-person perspective are of a visuovestibu-
lar nature. In the study discussed earlier59, participants 
viewed a visual image on the HMD that contained a 
conflict between the visual gravitational cues of the 
virtual body and the vestibular gravitational cues expe-
rienced by the participant’s physical body: the body 
that was shown in these experiments was presented 
in a direction that was incongruent with the direction 
of veridical gravity. The authors argued that this may 
have caused differences in the experienced direction 
of the first-person perspective, with participants from 
the up-group relying more strongly on vestibular cues 
from the physical body (indicating downward gravity 
directed towards the physical body) than on visual grav-
itational cues from the virtual body (indicating down-
ward gravity directed away from the physical body), 
whereas participants from the down-group show the 
opposite pattern. Indeed, there are inter-individual dif-
ferences in the extent of visuovestibular integration, and 
some subjects may rely more strongly on visual signals 
and others on vestibular signals135–138.
The possibility that the experienced direction of the 
first-person perspective depends on visuovestibular 
integration, especially when the subject is in the supine 
position, is also compatible with the finding that 73% of 
OBEs in the general population139 and >80% of OBEs 
in neurological patients occur in the supine position98. 
Moreover, the experienced direction of the first-person 
perspective is strongly altered in a bodily illusion — the 
inversion illusion — that is prevalent in people with oto-
lithic deficits and in microgravity conditions140–142. This 
illusion occurs in almost all healthy subjects placed in a 
microgravity environment142,143. It is characterized by a 180° 
inversion and a down-looking first-person perspective 
of the subject within a stable extrapersonal space and 
results from absent or abnormal gravitational signals 
and abnormal visuovestibular integration. Finally, body 
position is known to strongly affect visual and vestibular 
perception144–147 (BOX 2).
To summarize, these data collectively suggest that 
neurologically and experimentally induced changes in 
the experienced direction of the first-person perspective 
may be due to abnormal signal integration of otolithic 
and visual cues59,100,142,148–150.
The role of multimodal neurons in self-location and 
first-person perspective. It is possible that changes in 
self-location may, like changes in self-identification, 
involve shifts in the spatial characteristics of trunk-cen-
tred bimodal visuotactile neurons, especially in the TPJ 
and posterior parietal cortex (such as area VIP), but also 
in the medial PMC and, potentially, EBA. Thus, it can be 
speculated that the different visuotactile stroking pro-
cedures described above displace or enlarge the visual 
receptive fields of such bimodal neurons, so that they 
now also encode the more distant position of the seen 
body (FIG. 5a). In monkeys, it has been shown that visuo-
tactile stroking can change the properties of neurons in 
Box 1 | Egocentric and allocentric mental tranformations
There is a long tradition in cognitive neuroscience of studying ego- versus allocentric 
perspective taking and mental imagery. In egocentric paradigms, participants are 
classically asked to imagine shifting their position and perspective to a new position 
and perspective in space and make judgements about variable attributes or spatial 
relations of stimuli from the imagined position and perspective. Egocentric mental 
imagery has been associated with activation in the right middle temporal gyrus, 
supplementary motor area, left middle occipital gyrus206,207 and in the left 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ)208. Other studies, in which participants were asked to 
generate egocentric mental imagery by imagining themselves at the position and 
perspective of visually presented human figures, have reported bilateral (but 
predominantly right) TPJ activation, as well as bilateral extrastriate cortex activity in 
proximity to the extrastriate body area98,125, extending earlier findings209. This type of 
egocentric imagery was faster and more accurate when performed from an elevated 
visual viewpoint and was accompanied by stronger activation in the bilateral TPJ when 
compared to eye-level or lowered visual viewpoints210. Classically, these imagined 
egocentric viewpoints or bodily transformations are compared to imagined allocentric 
transformations, in which participants are asked to imagine a transformation of the 
scene, array or object, rather than a transformation of the observer’s viewpoint or 
position. Comparisons between ego- and allocentric transformations in behavioural 
and brain imaging studies132,207,211,212 have revealed that both are distinct brain 
processes, with allocentric transformations relying more strongly on structures in the 
right hemisphere, especially in the right posterior parietal cortex132,207,211,212.
Allocentric
An umbrella term for maps 
and/or patterns of modulation 
that are defined in relation to 
an object external to the 
observer.
Microgravity environment
Environments in which no 
gravity exists for short periods 
(parabolic flight) or prolonged 
periods (orbital flight).
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area 5 and the PMC, from encoding the location of an 
animal’s physical arm before stroking to an encoding of 
a fake arm after visuotactile stroking41,48. The presence 
of visuotactile neurons in areaVIP, the PMC and TPJ is 
well established, but this has not yet been investigated 
for the EBA. Moreover, the role of the EBA in self versus 
other discrimination and self-location is not completely 
understood: EBA activity seems to reflect first- versus 
third-person perspectives in some studies125 but not in 
others151,152.
However, the neuroimaging and neurological data 
reviewed above suggest that there are also differences 
between brain mechanisms of self-location versus self-
identification. Although the role of the PMC and EBA 
in self-identification has been shown by several stud-
ies, the involvement of the PMC in self-location is still 
unclear40,59 and EBA activity only marginally reflected 
self-location59. More importantly, self-location, but 
not self-identification, has been shown to depend on 
the first-person perspective, as evidenced by studies 
in healthy subjects59 and in patients with heautoscopy 
and OBEs. As discussed above, this suggests that self-
location and the first-person perspective may rely on 
additional vestibular graviceptive (otolithic) signals and 
their integration with visual graviceptive and soma-
tosensory signals and that this may require distinct 
brain processes.
I propose here that such distinct brain processes 
for self-location and the first-person perspective are 
localized in three regions within an area encompassing 
the posterior parietal cortex and the TPJ: the parieto-
insular vestibular cortex (PIVC), area VIP and area 
MST (middle superior temporal) (FIG. 5b). In monkeys, 
these regions are densely packed with vestibular neurons, 
and many of these neurons also have large and bilateral 
visual receptive fields, as well as large and bilateral soma-
tosensory receptive fields. The visual receptive fields are 
often >50°, and somatosensory receptive fields respond 
to stimulation of neck, shoulder, trunk or even half or 
the entire body surface of the animal (see REFS 153–159 
for the PIVC, REFS 90,158,159 for area VIP and REFS 158–
162 for area MST). In area VIP, for example, bimodal 
visuotactile neurons may encode the same visual and 
tactile movement direction89,90,104, and the receptive 
fields of some of these VIP neurons may cover the entire 
body and the entire visual field89 (FIG. 5b). As discussed 
above, some of these neurons may code for self-iden-
tification, but I speculate here that the subpopulation 
of VIP neurons that also respond to vestibular signals 
code for self-location and first-person perspective163,164 
(FIG. 5b). Such trimodal neurons have been described in 
the TPJ regions PIVC153,154 and area MST165–168 in mon-
keys. MST neurons have further been implicated in the 
perception of heading direction based on the integra-
tion of visual and vestibular signals165,168. Accordingly, it 
could be argued that the neurologically and experimen-
tally induced changes in the experienced direction of the 
first-person perspective and the associated changes in 
self-location are caused by absent or abnormal otolithic 
activity in visuovestibular neurons in area VIP, area 
MST and the PIVC. Otoliths are known to be ambigu-
ous indicators of orientation in space and are activated 
in the same manner by gravitational and translational 
signals169; such ambiguity is often resolved by visual 
and somatosensory inputs. Accordingly, abnormal oto-
lithic activity related to translation may be represented 
as a change in static orientation that is integrated with 
abnormal static visuotactile signals that indicate a static 
body position and an elevated and down-looking orien-
tation. Although no direct evidence for this possibility 
yet exists, it could be speculated that in the supine posi-
tion, trimodal PIVC, MST and VIP neurons may, dur-
ing robotically induced down-looking, not only encode 
the position of the physical body but also a spatially 
distinct, elevated position that is inverted by 180° and 
experienced as down-looking (FIG. 5c). The neuroimag-
ing and neurological lesion data in humans reviewed 
above and the important role of the PIVC and area MST 
in visuovestibular processing together suggest that such 
otolithic vestibular and visuotactile mechanisms of the 
first-person perspective and self-location may occur in 
these two brain regions, whereas area VIP may encode 
all three aspects of bodily self-consciousness.
Conclusions
The ‘I’ of conscious experience is one of the most aston-
ishing features of the human mind. Recent neuroscien-
tific investigations of self-identification, self-location 
and first-person perspective have described some of the 
multisensory brain processes that may give rise to bodily 
self-consciousness. As argued elsewhere1,170, these three 
Box 2 | Gravity and bodily self-consciousness
Our bodies have evolved in terrestrial gravity and have consequently adapted to 
constant linear acceleration. Reports from subjects experiencing microgravity show 
that the absence of this acceleration can trigger a number of illusory own-body 
perceptions, and this is compatible with internal brain models of gravity147,213. 
Weightlessness can be obtained during prolonged free fall in aircrafts during parabolic 
flights or in spacecraft in orbit. In parabolic flights, the free fall lasts for about 30 s, 
whereas in orbital flight one can keep on falling for several months. The data obtained 
from orbital and parabolic flights show that subjects have persisting sensations of their 
body or surrounding space being oriented up- or downwards (vertical orientation), 
even though the subjects understand that up and down are ‘meaningless’ concepts in 
microgravity. In addition, a range of bodily illusions has been reported in microgravity, 
which are likely to be the result of absent or abnormal gravitational signals, 
multisensory disintegration and top-down influences. The percept of vertical 
orientation only disappears when vestibular, somatosensory and visual cues are absent 
(that is, when people are free-floating with their eyes closed142). Almost all subjects 
report disorientation, vestibular symptoms or loss of a spatial anchoring under these 
conditions141. The most common own-body illusion in microgravity is the inversion 
illusion140–142, which was first described by Graybiel and Kellogg143. This is defined as a 
feeling of the body being upside-down relative to extrapersonal space (or the room 
being upside-down relative to the stable observer). According to Lackner142, multiple 
combinations of inversion illusion and room-tilt illusion may occur. The person may feel 
like he is upside-down while the room is in its normal orientation (for example, the floor 
of the aircraft is interpreted as being down); the person may feel upright while the room 
is upside down; and the person may also feel upside-down in an upside-down room. 
These illusions can be so compelling that the subjects assume an incorrect position 
when they are preparing themselves for the end of the parabola and have led to major 
accidents in orbital flights. Last, touch and pressure cues have a strong influence on the 
inversion illusion, underlining that under conditions of absent or abnormal otholithic 
cues, the perception of verticality and own-body orientation in space depends not only 
on vestibular and visual cues but also on somatosensory input.
Vestibular neurons
Neurons responding to 
activation of receptors in the 
vestibular labyrinth 
(semicircular canals and otolith 
organs).
Otoliths
Organs in the vestibular 
labyrinth of the inner ear that 
are sensitive to linear 
acceleration and gravity.
Translational signals
Otolithic vestibular signals that 
cause linear acceleration.
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aspects are the necessary constituents of the simplest 
form of self-consciousness that arises when the brain 
encodes the origin of the first-person perspective from 
within a spatial frame of reference (that is, self-location) 
associated with self-identification. The reviewed data 
highlight the role of the PMC, IPS, EBA, sensorimotor 
cortex and — concerning self-location and the first-
person perspective — the temporoparietal cortex in 
bodily self-consciousness as informed by multisensory 
and vestibular signals. I propose that self-identification 
Figure 5 | Multimodal neurons in illusory self-location and the first-person perspective. a | Hypothetical changes in 
the size and/or position of the visual receptive field (vRF) of bimodal neurons in area VIP (ventral intraparietal) that may be 
associated with changes in self-location during the full-body illusion. The large vRF of a bimodal visuotactile neuron that 
responds to bilateral visual stimuli in the upper and lower visual field and in proximity to the subject’s body is shown (pink area). 
The neuron’s corresponding tactile RF (tRF) is shown in the middle panel and responds to touches applied to head, trunk, arms 
and legs (blue area). Seeing one’s filmed body during the full-body illusion may alter the size and/or position of the vRFs (shown 
in pink) of such body-centred visuotactile neurons so that they extend to the more distant position of the seen filmed body 
(right panel), especially under conditions of synchronous visuotactile stroking. b | The receptive fields of a trimodal neuron in 
area VIP that responds to tactile, vestibular and visual signals is shown164. The left panel shows the location and size of the 
neuron’s tRF (in blue), covering the entire head. The neuron is also direction-selective and encodes selectively back-to-front 
motion within the tRF (motion direction is indicated by the arrow below the panel). The same neuron also responds to 
vestibular stimulation and selectively encodes backward translation of the animal (middle panel; motion direction is indicated 
by the arrow below the panel). Finally, this neuron also responds to visual stimulation (receding optic flow and motion direction 
are indicated by the arrow below the panel). Similar neurons have been described in areas of the PIVC (parieto-insular 
vestibular cortex)153,154 and area MST (middle superior temporal)160–162. c | Hypothetical changes in the size and/or position of 
the vRF of trimodal neurons in area VIP, the PIVC and area MST that may be associated with changes in self-location and a 
down-looking first-person perspective during the full-body illusion. The large vRF of a trimodal visuotactile–vestibular neuron 
that responds to stimuli applied to bilateral visual stimuli in the upper and lower visual field and in proximity to the subject’s 
body is shown (pink). Seeing a filmed body during the full-body illusion (induced by synchronous visuotactile stimulation) that 
was filmed in a posture and direction (upward) that is incongruent with the direction of veridical gravity (downward) may alter 
visuovestibular coding by trimodal neurons and induce abnormal otolithic perception. This association of abnormal otolithic 
signals that are integrated with abnormal visuotactile signals (during the full-body illusion) may lead to a change in perceived 
body orientation of the participant and may be associated with changes in the size and/or position of vRFs that also respond to 
the more distant position of the seen filmed body.
depends on somatosensory and visual signals and 
involves bimodal visuotactile neurons, and that self-
location and the first-person perspective depend on the 
integration of these bodily signals with vestibular cues 
in trimodal visuotactile–vestibular neurons. These dif-
ferences between self-identification versus self-location 
and first-person perspective are corroborated by neu-
roimaging and neurological data; these data show that 
self-identification recruits primarily bilateral PMC and 
IPS and that self-location and first-person perspective 
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recruit posterior parietal–TPJ regions (such as area MST 
and the PIVC) with a right hemispheric predominance. 
Posterior IPS regions such as area VIP may be involved 
in both self-identification and self-location. The con-
tributions of other regions (such as the EBA and sen-
sorimotor cortex) have been less robust across studies. 
Although much of the present Review may suggest that 
self-location and first-person perspective rely on the 
same brain mechanisms, neurological observations sug-
gest that these aspects of bodily self-consciousness are 
in fact different and probably based on at least partially 
distinct brain mechanisms105.
The reviewed data extend other prominent proposals 
concerning the neural basis of bodily self-consciousness 
that have highlighted brain processes related to internal 
states of the body, such as interoceptive and homeostatic 
systems (for example, the heartbeat) as important sig-
nals, and that have highlighted the contribution of either 
the insula171 or the posterior medial parietal cortex172,173. 
Future research should explore the interactions between 
exteroceptive bodily signals (which the present Review 
focused on) and interoceptive and sensorimotor sig-
nals5,174, their relevance for self-consciousness and their 
distinct and common brain mechanisms175.
A cautionary note is warranted. The current amount 
of experimental data on bodily self-consciousness is very 
limited. Moreover, responses are often variable within 
and between subjects and are rarely based on repeated 
measures. Future research should include more pre-
cise measurements and more rigorous approaches 
based on psychophysical and, eventually, mathematical 
approaches. Additional research should be carried out, 
analysing functional and anatomical connectivity176,177 
between the brain regions of bodily self-consciousness 
and how they relate to the so-called default mode net-
work176, which has been associated with self-related 
processing178. Further technological advances in virtual 
reality and robotics and their merging with cognitive 
science, brain imaging and clinical work are needed to 
provide the necessary bodily stimulations and the induc-
tion of stronger and prolonged altered states of self-con-
sciousness. Comparable research needs to be carried 
out in non-human primates and rodents. These lines of 
research are likely to provide much ground for fascinat-
ing future research in neuroscience and experimental 
psychology as well as philosophy of mind and ethics.
Future directions
How does self-consciousness relate to the much larger 
field of consciousness studies? Empirical research into 
brain mechanisms of consciousness has mainly focused 
on behavioural and neural differences between conscious 
and unconscious processing of stimuli, mostly in the vis-
ual system179,180. Can such consciousness arise without 
or during strongly altered self-consciousness? This is an 
interesting topic for future research, and would require 
integrating studies of bodily self-consciousness with 
research into conscious and unconscious target detection, 
binocular rivalry, bistable perception, change blindness 
and other perceptions in well-defined psychophysical 
settings181. Bodily self-consciousness may turn out to be 
an important component for consciousness generally173. 
Certainly “it is not enough to say that the mind (and con-
sciousness) is embodied. You also have to say how”182, 
and bodily self-consciousness may provide this link.
Cognitive psychologists and neuroscientists have 
studied many different aspects of the self (see REFS 
2,4,5,125,129,183–190). Future work should address how 
self-consciousness is linked to language (for example, see 
REFS 117,191) and to memory and future prediction173 
(also see REFS 192,193) to study ‘narrative’ and ‘extended’ 
aspects of self-consciousness, respectively. The behav-
ioural and neural mechanisms of bodily self-conscious-
ness should further be studied jointly with self-related 
processes such as perceptual and imagined viewpoint 
changes129, theory-of-mind and mentalizing194, empathy, 
and with consciousness in the motor and sensorimotor 
systems5,195.
Finally, recent developments in virtual reality and 
robotics are opening novel avenues for human enhance-
ment of sensorimotor and cognitive function. Virtual 
reality has already played an important part in augment-
ing cognition, assisting motor rehabilitation and as an 
effective treatment in anxiety and specific phobias196,197. 
These treatments may be complemented and improved 
by including automatized manipulations of illusory hand 
ownership, self-location and self-identification. Diagnosis 
and treatments of other medical conditions such as pain 
syndromes76,198 and inflammation199 may also benefit 
from artificially induced changes in hand ownership, self-
location and self-identification. Finally, the manipulation 
of bodily self-consciousness may generate and enhance 
bodily feelings for de-afferented body parts in patients 
with tetra- and paraplegia. Recent work in patients with 
amputations — initiated by Ramachandran and col-
leagues64 — has already explored these possibilities for 
the design of future artificial limbs200,201. Patients with 
severely disabling and chronic conditions, such as para- 
and tetraplegia following spinal cord injury, may profit 
in the future from self-enhanced or augmented artificial 
bodies, allowing them not only to move but also to feel 
the ‘digital body’ as their own body202–205.
R E V I E W S
568 | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION  www.nature.com/reviews/neuro
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
14. Sollier, P. Les Phénomènes d’Autoscopie (Alcan, 1903) 
(in French).
15. Gerstmann, J. Problem of imperception of disease and 
of impaired body territories with organic lesions. Arch. 
Neurol. Psychiatry 48, 890–913 (1942).
16. Halligan, P. W., Marshall, J. C. & Wade, D. T. Unilateral 
somatoparaphrenia after right hemisphere stroke: a 
case description. Cortex 31, 173–182 (1995).
17. Fotopoulou, A. et al. Mirror-view reverses 
somatoparaphrenia: dissociation between first- and 
third-person perspectives on body ownership. 
Neuropsychologia 49, 3946–3955 (2011).
18. Vallar, G. & Ronchi, R. Somatoparaphrenia: a body 
delusion. A review of the neuropsychological literature. 
Exp. Brain Res. 192, 533–551 (2009).
19. Baier, B. & Karnath, H. O. Tight link between our 
sense of limb ownership and self-awareness of actions. 
Stroke 39, 486–488 (2008).
20. Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. Rubber hands ‘feel’ touch 
that eyes see. Nature 391, 756 (1998).
21. Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C. & Passingham, R. E. That’s 
my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of 
ownership of a limb. Science 305, 875–877 (2004).
22. Slater, M., Perez-Marcos, D., Ehrsson, H. H. & 
Sanchez-Vives, M. V. Towards a digital body: the virtual 
arm illusion. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 2, 6 (2008).
23. Tsakiris, M. & Haggard, P. The rubber hand illusion 
revisited: visuotactile integration and self-attribution. 
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 31, 80–91 
(2005).
24. Kammers, M. P., de Vignemont, F., Verhagen, L. & 
Dijkerman, H. C. The rubber hand illusion in action. 
Neuropsychologia 47, 204–211 (2009).
25. Lloyd, D. M. Spatial limits on referred touch to an 
alien limb may reflect boundaries of visuo-tactile 
peripersonal space surrounding the hand. Brain Cogn. 
64, 104–109 (2007).
26. Makin, T. R., Holmes, N. P. & Ehrsson, H. H. On the 
other hand: dummy hands and peripersonal space. 
Behav. Brain Res. 191, 1–10 (2008).
27. Tsakiris, M. My body in the brain: a neurocognitive 
model of body-ownership. Neuropsychologia 48, 
703–712 (2010).
28. Rohde, M., Di Luca, M. & Ernst, M. O. The Rubber 
Hand Illusion: feeling of ownership and proprioceptive 
drift do not go hand in hand. PLoS ONE 6, e21659 
(2011). 
29. Ehrsson, H. H., Holmes, N. P. & Passingham, R. E. 
Touching a rubber hand: feeling of body ownership is 
associated with activity in multisensory brain areas. 
J. Neurosci. 25, 10564–10573 (2005).
30. Kammers, M. P. et al. Is this hand for real? 
Attenuation of the rubber hand illusion by transcranial 
magnetic stimulation over the inferior parietal lobule. 
J. Cogn. Neurosci. 21, 1311–1320 (2009).
31. Kanayama, N., Sato, A. & Ohira, H. Crossmodal effect 
with rubber hand illusion and gamma-band activity. 
Psychophysiology 44, 392–402 (2007).
32. Kanayama, N., Sato, A. & Ohira, H. The role of gamma 
band oscillations and synchrony on rubber hand 
illusion and crossmodal integration. Brain Cogn. 69, 
19–29 (2009).
33. Tsakiris, M., Hesse, M. D., Boy, C., Haggard, P. & Fink, 
G. R. Neural signatures of body ownership: a sensory 
network for bodily self-consciousness. Cereb. Cortex 
17, 2235–2244 (2007).
34. Ehrsson, H. H., Wiech, K., Weiskopf, N., Dolan, R. J. & 
Passingham, R. E. Threatening a rubber hand that you 
feel is yours elicits a cortical anxiety response. Proc. 
Natl Acad. Sci. USA 104, 9828–9833 (2007).
35. Lloyd, D., Morrison, I. & Roberts, N. Role for human 
posterior parietal cortex in visual processing of 
aversive objects in peripersonal space. 
J. Neurophysiol. 95, 205–214 (2006).
36. Zeller, D., Gross, C., Bartsch, A., Johansen-Berg, H. & 
Classen, J. Ventral premotor cortex may be required 
for dynamic changes in the feeling of limb ownership: 
a lesion study. J. Neurosci. 31, 4852–4857 (2011).
37. Bremmer, F. et al. Polymodal motion processing in 
posterior parietal and premotor cortex: a human fMRI 
study strongly implies equivalencies between humans 
and monkeys. Neuron 29, 287–296 (2001).
38. Fogassi, L. et al. Coding of peripersonal space in 
inferior premotor cortex (area F4). J. Neurophysiol. 
76, 141–157 (1996).
39. Gentile, G., Petkova, V. I. & Ehrsson, H. H. Integration 
of visual and tactile signals from the hand in the 
human brain: an FMRI study. J. Neurophysiol. 105, 
910–922 (2011).
40. Graziano, M. S. & Gandhi, S. Location of the 
polysensory zone in the precentral gyrus of 
anesthetized monkeys. Exp. Brain Res. 135, 259–266 
(2000).
41. Graziano, M. S., Hu, X. T. & Gross, C. G. Visuospatial 
properties of ventral premotor cortex. 
J. Neurophysiol. 77, 2268–2292 (1997).
42. Iriki, A., Tanaka, M. & Iwamura, Y. Coding of modified 
body schema during tool use by macaque postcentral 
neurones. Neuroreport 7, 2325–2330 (1996).
43. Maravita, A. & Iriki, A. Tools for the body (schema). 
Trends Cogn. Sci. 8, 79–86 (2004).
An important review on multisensory integration of 
the upper extremity, in particular the integration  
of visual, tactile and proprioceptive signals in the 
parietal cortex of human and non-human primates.
44. Petkova, V. I. et al. From part- to whole-body 
ownership in the multisensory brain. Curr. Biol. 21, 
1118–1122 (2011).
An important study on the brain mechanisms of 
self-identification using fMRI and virtual reality.
45. Farne, A., Iriki, A. & Ladavas, E. Shaping multisensory 
action–space with tools: evidence from patients with 
cross-modal extinction. Neuropsychologia 43,  
238–248 (2005).
46. Holmes, N. P., Calvert, G. A. & Spence, C. Tool use 
changes multisensory interactions in seconds: 
evidence from the crossmodal congruency task. Exp. 
Brain Res. 183, 465–476 (2007).
47. Maravita, A., Spence, C., Sergent, C. & Driver, J. 
Seeing your own touched hands in a mirror modulates 
cross-modal interactions. Psychol. Sci. 13, 350–355 
(2002).
48. Graziano, M. S., Cooke, D. F. & Taylor, C. S. Coding the 
location of the arm by sight. Science 290,  
1782–1786 (2000).
Important research in macaque monkeys on the 
neurophysiology of area 5 neurons and the 
integration of visual, proprioceptive and tactile 
cues. These findings are of relevance for 
self-attribution of an individual’s hand.
49. Dieguez, S., Mercier, M. R., Newby, N. & Blanke, O. 
Feeling numbness for someone else’s finger. Curr. Biol. 
19, R1108–R1109 (2009).
50. Tastevin, J. En partant de lexpérience d’Aristote: les 
déplacements artificiels des parties du corps ne sont 
pas suivis par le sentiment de ces parties ni pas les 
sensations qu’on peut y produire. Encephale 1,  
140–158 (1937) (in French).
51. Brugger, P., Regard, M. & Landis, T. Unilaterally felt 
presences: the neuropsychiatry of one’s invisible 
Doppelgänger. Neuropsychiatry Neuropsychol. Behav. 
Neurol. 9, 114–122 (1996).
52. Heydrich, L., Dieguez, S., Grunwald, T., Seeck, M. & 
Blanke, O. Illusory own body perceptions: case reports 
and relevance for bodily self-consciousness. Conscious. 
Cogn. 19, 702–710 (2010).
53. Sforza, A., Bufalari, I., Haggard, P. & Aglioti, S. M. My 
face in yours: visuo-tactile facial stimulation influences 
sense of identity. Soc. Neurosci. 5, 148–162 (2010).
54. Tsakiris, M. Looking for myself: current multisensory 
input alters self-face recognition. PLoS ONE 3, e4040 
(2008).
55. Bolognini, N., Ladavas, E. & Farne, A. Spatial 
perspective and coordinate systems in autoscopy: a 
case report of a “fantome de profil” in occipital brain 
damage. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 23, 1741–1751 (2011).
56. Devinsky, O., Feldmann, E., Burrowes, K. &  
Bromfield, E. Autoscopic phenomena with seizures. 
Arch. Neurol. 46, 1080–1088 (1989).
57. Grusser, O. J. & Landis, T. in Visual Agnosia and Other 
Disturbances of Visual Perception and Cognition (eds 
Grusser, O. J. & Landis, T.) 297–303 (Macmillan, 1991).
58. Ehrsson, H. H. The experimental induction of 
out-of-body experiences. Science 317, 1048 (2007).
59. Ionta, S. et al. Multisensory mechanisms in temporo-
parietal cortex support self-location and first-person 
perspective. Neuron 70, 363–374 (2011).
An important study on the brain mechanisms of 
self-identification, self-location and the first-person 
perspective using fMRI with neuroscience robotics.
60. Lenggenhager, B., Tadi, T., Metzinger, T. & Blanke, O. 
Video ergo sum: manipulating bodily self-
consciousness. Science 317, 1096–1099 (2007).
61. Lenggenhager, B., Mouthon, M. & Blanke, O. Spatial 
aspects of bodily self-consciousness. Conscious. Cogn. 
18, 110–117 (2009).
62. Altschuler, E. L. & Ramachandran, V. S. A simple 
method to stand outside oneself. Perception 36,  
632–634 (2007).
63. Mizumoto, M. & Ishikawa, M. Immunity to error 
through misidentification and the bodily illusion 
experiment J. Conscious. Stud. 12, 3–19 (2005).
64. Ramachandran, V. S., Rogers-Ramachandran, D. & 
Cobb, S. Touching the phantom limb. Nature 377, 
489–490 (1995).
65. Stratton, G. M. The spatial harmony of touch and 
sight. Mind 8 492–505 (1899).
66. von Helmholtz, H. Helmholtz’s Treatise on 
Physiological Optics (Dover Publication, 1962).
67. Spence, C., Pavani, F. & Driver, J. Spatial constraints 
on visual-tactile cross-modal distractor congruency 
effects. Cogn. Affect Behav. Neurosci. 4, 148–169 
(2004).
68. Aspell, J. E., Lenggenhager, B. & Blanke, O. Keeping in 
touch with one’s self: multisensory mechanisms of self-
consciousness. PLoS ONE 4, e6488 (2009).
69. Igarashi, Y., Kimura, Y., Spence, C. & Ichihara, S. The 
selective effect of the image of a hand on visuotactile 
interactions as assessed by performance on the 
crossmodal congruency task. Exp. Brain Res. 184, 
31–38 (2008).
70. Pavani, F. & Castiello, U. Binding personal and 
extrapersonal space through body shadows. Nature 
Neurosci. 7, 14–16 (2004).
71. Pavani, F., Spence, C. & Driver, J. Visual capture of 
touch: out-of-the-body experiences with rubber gloves. 
Psychol. Sci. 11, 353–359 (2000).
72. Shore, D. I., Barnes, M. E. & Spence, C. Temporal 
aspects of the visuotactile congruency effect. Neurosci. 
Lett. 392, 96–100 (2006).
73. Aspell, J. E., Lavanchy, T., Lenggenhager, B. &  
Blanke, O. Seeing the body modulates audiotactile 
integration. Eur. J. Neurosci. 31, 1868–1873 (2010).
74. Zopf, R., Savage, G. & Williams, M. A. Crossmodal 
congruency measures of lateral distance effects on the 
rubber hand illusion. Neuropsychologia 48, 713–725 
(2010).
75. Petkova, V. I. & Ehrsson, H. H. If I were you: perceptual 
illusion of body swapping. PLoS ONE 3, e3832 (2008).
76. Hansel, A., Lenggenhager, B., von Kanel, R., Curatolo, 
M. & Blanke, O. Seeing and identifying with a virtual 
body decreases pain perception. Eur. J. Pain 15,  
874–879 (2011).
77. Lenggenhager, B., Halje, P. & Blanke, O. Alpha band 
oscillations correlate with illusory self-location induced 
by virtual reality. Eur. J. Neurosci. 33, 1935–1943 
(2011).
78. Pineda, J. A. The functional significance of mu 
rhythms: translating “seeing” and “hearing” into 
“doing”. Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. 50, 57–68  
(2005).
79. Oakes, T. R. et al. Functional coupling of simultaneous 
electrical and metabolic activity in the human brain. 
Hum. Brain Mapp. 21, 257–270 (2004).
80. Gastaut, H. Etude électrocorticographique de la 
réactivité des rhythms rolandiques. Rev. Neurol. 
(Paris) 87, 176–182 (1952) (in French).
81. Pfurtscheller, G. & Neuper, C. Motor imagery activates 
primary sensorimotor area in humans. Neurosci. Lett. 
239, 65–68 (1997).
82. Ulloa, E. R. & Pineda, J. A. Recognition of point-light 
biological motion: mu rhythms and mirror neuron 
activity. Behav. Brain Res. 183, 188–194 (2007).
83. Pfurtscheller, G. Central beta rhythm during 
sensorimotor activities in man. Electroencephalogr. 
Clin. Neurophysiol. 51, 253–264 (1981).
84. Cheyne, D. et al. Neuromagnetic imaging of cortical 
oscillations accompanying tactile stimulation. Brain 
Res. Cogn. Brain Res. 17, 599–611 (2003).
85. Astafiev, S. V., Stanley, C. M., Shulman, G. L. & 
Corbetta, M. Extrastriate body area in human 
occipital cortex responds to the performance of motor 
actions. Nature Neurosci. 7, 542–548 (2004).
86. Downing, P. E., Jiang, Y., Shuman, M. & Kanwisher, N. 
A cortical area selective for visual processing of the 
human body. Science 293, 2470–2473 (2001).
87. Grossman, E. D. & Blake, R. Brain areas active during 
visual perception of biological motion. Neuron 35, 
1167–1175 (2002).
88. Urgesi, C., Candidi, M., Ionta, S. & Aglioti, S. M. 
Representation of body identity and body actions in 
extrastriate body area and ventral premotor cortex. 
Nature Neurosci. 10, 30–31 (2007).
89. Duhamel, J. R., Colby, C. L. & Goldberg, M. E. in Brain 
and Space (ed. Paillard, J.) 223–236 (Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1991).
90. Duhamel, J. R., Colby, C. L. & Goldberg, M. E. Ventral 
intraparietal area of the macaque: congruent visual 
and somatic response properties. J. Neurophysiol. 79, 
126–136 (1998).
Pioneering work on the neurophysiology of VIP 
neurons and the integration of visual and tactile cues 
that are likely to be of relevance for self-identification.
R E V I E W S
NATURE REVIEWS | NEUROSCIENCE  ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | 569
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
91. Armel, K. C. & Ramachandran, V. S. Projecting 
sensations to external objects: evidence from skin 
conductance response. Proc. Biol. Sci. 270,  
1499–1506 (2003).
92. Taoka, M., Toda, T., Iriki, A., Tanaka, M. & Iwamura, Y. 
Bilateral receptive field neurons in the hindlimb region 
of the postcentral somatosensory cortex in awake 
macaque monkeys. Exp. Brain Res. 134, 139–146 
(2000).
93. Taoka, M., Toda, T. & Iwamura, Y. Representation of 
the midline trunk, bilateral arms, and shoulders in the 
monkey postcentral somatosensory cortex. Exp. Brain 
Res. 123, 315–322 (1998).
94. Sakata, H., Taira, M., Murata, A. & Mine, S. Neural 
mechanisms of visual guidance of hand action in the 
parietal cortex of the monkey. Cereb. Cortex 5,  
429–438 (1995).
95. Kitada, R., Johnsrude, I. S., Kochiyama, T. & 
Lederman, S. J. Functional specialization and 
convergence in the occipito-temporal cortex 
supporting haptic and visual identification of human 
faces and body parts: an fMRI study. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 21, 2027–2045 (2009).
96. Cardini, F. et al. Viewing one’s own face being touched 
modulates tactile perception: an fMRI study. J. Cogn. 
Neurosci. 23, 503–513 (2011).
97. Brugger, P. Reflective mirrors: perspective-taking in 
autoscopic phenomena. Cogn. Neuropsychiatry 7, 
179–194 (2002).
98. Blanke, O. & Mohr, C. Out-of-body experience, 
heautoscopy, and autoscopic hallucination of 
neurological origin: implications for neurocognitive 
mechanisms of corporeal awareness and self-
consciousness. Brain Res. Brain Res. Rev. 50,  
184–199 (2005).
A useful review about the neurological findings in a 
large number of patients suffering from autoscopic 
phenomena that are associated with abnormal 
bodily self-consciousness.
99. Lukianowicz, N. Autoscopic phenomena. AMA Arch. 
Neurol. Psychiatry 80, 199–220 (1958).
100. Blanke, O., Landis, T., Spinelli, L. & Seeck, M. 
Out-of-body experience and autoscopy of neurological 
origin. Brain 127, 243–258 (2004).
101. Brugger, P., Agosti, R., Regard, M., Wieser, H. G. & 
Landis, T. Heautoscopy, epilepsy, and suicide. 
J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry 57, 838–839 
(1994).
102. Pearson, J. & Dewhurst, K. Two cases of heautoscopic 
phenomena following organic lesions. Encephale 43, 
166–172 (1954).
103. Lunn, V. Autoscopic phenomena. Acta Psych Scand. 
46, 118–125 (1970).
104. Avillac, M., Deneve, S., Olivier, E., Pouget, A. & 
Duhamel, J. R. Reference frames for representing 
visual and tactile locations in parietal cortex. Nature 
Neurosci. 8, 941–949 (2005).
105. De Ridder, D., Van Laere, K., Dupont, P., Menovsky, T. 
& Van de Heyning, P. Visualizing out-of-body 
experience in the brain. N. Engl. J. Med. 357,  
1829–1833 (2007).
106. Claparede, E. D. Note sur la localisation du moi. Arch. 
Psychol. 19, 172–182 (1924) (in French).
107. Hoffmann, F. R. Über die Sehrichtungen. Graefe’s 
Arch. Clin. Exp. Opthalmol. 116, 135–142 (1926) (in 
German).
108. Bertossa, F., Besa, M., Ferrari, R. & Ferri, F. Point 
zero: a phenomenological inquiry into the seat of 
consciousness. Percept. Mot. Skills 107, 323–335 
(2008).
109. Limanowski, J. & Hecht, H. Where do we stand on 
locating the self? Psychology 2, 312–317 (2011).
110. Roelofs, C. O. Considerations on the visual egocenter. 
Acta Pschol. 16, 226–234 (1959).
111. Harris, C. S. Perceptual adaptation to inverted, 
reversed, and displaced vision. Psychol. Rev. 72, 
419–444 (1965).
112. Held, R. & Freedman, S. J. Plasticity in human 
sensorimotor control. Science 142, 455–462  
(1963).
113. Kohler, I. Uber Aufbau und Wandlungen der 
Wahrnehmungswelt. Östereichische Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. Philosophisch historische Klasse 
227, 1–118 (1951) (in German).
114. Pisella, L., Rode, G., Farne, A., Tilikete, C. &  
Rossetti, Y. Prism adaptation in the rehabilitation of 
patients with visuo-spatial cognitive disorders. Curr. 
Opin. Neurol. 19, 534–542 (2006).
115. Welch, R. B. Research on adaptation to rearranged 
vision: 1966–1974. Perception 3, 367–392  
(1974).
116. Brugger, P., Regard, M. & Landis, T. Illusory 
reduplication of one’s own body: phenomenology and 
classification of autoscopic phenomena. Cogn. 
Neuropsychiatry 2, 19–38 (1997).
117. Dennett, D. C. Consciousness Explained (Penguin 
Books, 1991).
118. Nagel, T. The View from Nowhere (Oxford Univ. Press, 
1986).
119. Shoemaker, S. The First-person Perspective and Other 
Essays (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).
120. Blanke, O., Ortigue, S., Landis, T. & Seeck, M. 
Stimulating illusory own-body perceptions. Nature 
419, 269–270 (2002).
121. Penfield, W. & Jaspers, H. Epilepsy and the Functional 
Anatomy of the Human Brain (Little Brown & Co, 
1954).
122. Tong, F. Out-of-body experiences: from Penfield to 
present. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 104–106 (2003).
123. Brandt, C., Brechtelsbauer, D., Bien, C. G. & Reiners, K. 
[Out-of-body experience as possible seizure symptom 
in a patient with a right parietal lesion]. Nervenarzt 
76, 1259–1262 (2005) (in German).
124. Maillard, L., Vignal, J. P., Anxionnat, R. & 
TaillandierVespignani, L. Semiologic value of ictal 
autoscopy. Epilepsia 45, 391–394 (2004).
125. Arzy, S., Thut, G., Mohr, C., Michel, C. M. & Blanke, O. 
Neural basis of embodiment: distinct contributions of 
temporoparietal junction and extrastriate body area. 
J. Neurosci. 26, 8074–8081 (2006).
126. Petkova, V. I., Khoshnevis, M. & Ehrsson, H. H. The 
perspective matters! Multisensory integration in ego-
centric reference frames determines full-body 
ownership. Front. Psychol. 2, 35 (2011).
127. Slater, M., Spanlang, B., Sanchez-Vives, M. V. & 
Blanke, O. First person experience of body transfer in 
virtual reality. PLoS ONE 5, e10564 (2010).
128. David, N. et al. Neural representations of self versus 
other: visual-spatial perspective taking and agency in 
a virtual ball-tossing game. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 18, 
898–910 (2006).
129. Vogeley, K. & Fink, G. R. Neural correlates of the first-
person-perspective. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 38–42 (2003).
130. Vogeley, K. et al. Neural correlates of first-person 
perspective as one constituent of human self-
consciousness. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 16, 817–827 
(2004).
131. Corradi-Dell’acqua, C. et al. Effects of shifting 
perspective of the self: an fMRI study. Neuroimage 40, 
1902–1911 (2008).
132. Zacks, J. M. & Michelon, P. Transformations of 
visuospatial images. Behav. Cogn. Neurosci. Rev. 4, 
96–118 (2005).
133. Burgess, N., Maguire, E. A., Spiers, H. J. & O’Keefe, J. 
A temporoparietal and prefrontal network for 
retrieving the spatial context of lifelike events. 
Neuroimage 14, 439–453 (2001).
134. Lambrey, S. et al. Distinct visual perspective-taking 
strategies involve the left and right medial temporal 
lobe structures differently. Brain 131, 523–534 (2008).
135. Golomer, E., Cremieux, J., Dupui, P., Isableu, B. & 
Ohlmann, T. Visual contribution to self-induced body 
sway frequencies and visual perception of male 
professional dancers. Neurosci. Lett. 267, 189–192 
(1999).
136. Isableu, B., Ohlmann, T., Cremieux, J. & Amblard, B. 
Selection of spatial frame of reference and postural 
control variability. Exp. Brain Res. 114, 584–589 
(1997).
137. Lopez, C., Lacour, M., Magnan, J. & Borel, L. Visual 
field dependence-independence before and after 
unilateral vestibular loss. Neuroreport 17, 797–803 
(2006).
138. Young, L. R., Oman, C. M., Watt, D. G., Money, K. E. & 
Lichtenberg, B. K. Spatial orientation in 
weightlessness and readaptation to earth’s gravity. 
Science 225, 205–208 (1984).
139. Green, C. E. Out-of-Body Experiences (Hamish 
Hamilton, 1968).
140. Gurovskiy, N. N., Bryanov, I. I. & Yegorov, A. D. 
Changes in the vestibular function during space flight. 
Acta Astronaut. 2, 207–216 (1975).
141. Kornilova, L. N. Orientation illusions in spaceflight. 
J. Vestib. Res. 7, 429–439 (1997).
142. Lackner, J. R. Spatial orientation in weightless 
environments. Perception 21, 803–812 (1992).
143. Graybiel, A. & Kellogg, R. S. Inversion illusion in 
parabolic flight: its probable dependence on otolith 
function. Aerosp. Med. 38, 1099–1103 (1967).
144. Aubert, H. Eine scheinbare bedeutende Drehung von 
Objecten bei Neigung des Kopfes nach rechts oder links. 
Virchows Archiv. 20, 381–393 (1861) (in German).
145. Jenkin, H. L., Dyde, R. T., Jenkin, M. R., Howard, I. P. 
& Harris, L. R. Relative role of visual and non-visual 
cues in determining the direction of “up”: experiments 
in the York tilted room facility. J. Vestib. Res. 13,  
287–293 (2003).
146. Lopez, C., Bachofner, C., Mercier, M. & Blanke, O. 
Gravity and observer’s body orientation influence the 
visual perception of human body postures. J. Vis. 9, 
11–14 (2009).
147. Mittelstaedt, H. The role of the otoliths in perception 
of the orientation of self and world to the vertical. 
Zool. Jahrb. Abt Physiol. 95, 418–425 (1991).
148. Lopez, C., Halje, P. & Blanke, O. Body ownership and 
embodiment: vestibular and multisensory mechanisms. 
Neurophysiol. Clin. 38, 149–161 (2008).
149. Solms, M., Kaplan-Solms, K., Saling, M. & Miller, P. 
Inverted vision after frontal lobe disease. Cortex 24, 
499–509 (1988).
150. Tiliket, C., Ventre-Dominey, J., Vighetto, A. & 
Grochowicki, M. Room tilt illusion. A central otolith 
dysfunction. Arch. Neurol. 53, 1259–1264 (1996).
151. Chan, A. W., Peelen, M. V. & Downing, P. E. The effect 
of viewpoint on body representation in the extrastriate 
body area. Neuroreport 15, 2407–2410 (2004).
152. Saxe, R., Jamal, N. & Powell, L. My body or yours? 
The effect of visual perspective on cortical body 
representations. Cereb. Cortex 16, 178–182 (2006).
153. Grusser, O. J., Pause, M. & Schreiter, U. Vestibular 
neurones in the parieto-insular cortex of monkeys 
(Macaca fascicularis): visual and neck receptor 
responses. J. Physiol. 430, 559–583 (1990).
154. Grusser, O. J., Pause, M. & Schreiter, U. Localization 
and responses of neurones in the parieto-insular 
vestibular cortex of awake monkeys (Macaca 
fascicularis). J. Physiol. 430, 537–557 (1990).
Pioneering work on the neurophysiology of PIVC 
neurons and the integration of visual, vestibular 
and somatosensory cues that are likely to be of 
relevance for self-location and the first-person 
perspective.
155. Robinson, C. J. & Burton, H. Somatotopographic 
organization in the second somatosensory area of 
M. fascicularis. J. Comp. Neurol. 192, 43–67 (1980).
156. Schneider, R. J., Friedman, D. P. & Mishkin, M.  
A modality-specific somatosensory area within the 
insula of the rhesus monkey. Brain Res. 621,  
116–120 (1993).
157. Guldin, W. O., Akbarian, S. & Grusser, O. J. Cortico-
cortical connections and cytoarchitectonics of the 
primate vestibular cortex: a study in squirrel monkeys 
(Saimiri sciureus). J. Comp. Neurol. 326, 375–401 
(1992).
158. Guldin, W. O. & Grusser, O. J. Is there a vestibular 
cortex? Trends Neurosci. 21, 254–259 (1998).
159. Lopez, C. & Blanke, O. The thalamocortical vestibular 
system in animals and humans. Brain Res. Rev. 67, 
119–146 (2011).
A comprehensive review about the vestibular 
cortex and the processing of vestibular, visual and 
somatosensory signals including 
neurophysiological, neuroanatomical and 
neuroimaging data in animals and humans.
160. Duffy, C. J. MST neurons respond to optic flow and 
translational movement. J. Neurophysiol. 80,  
1816–1827 (1998).
161. Duffy, C. J. & Wurtz, R. H. Sensitivity of MST neurons 
to optic flow stimuli. I. A continuum of response 
selectivity to large-field stimuli. J. Neurophysiol. 65, 
1329–1345 (1991).
162. Tanaka, K. & Saito, H. Analysis of motion of the visual 
field by direction, expansion/contraction, and rotation 
cells clustered in the dorsal part of the medial superior 
temporal area of the macaque monkey. 
J. Neurophysiol. 62, 626–641 (1989).
163. Schlack, A., Hoffmann, K. P. & Bremmer, F. Interaction 
of linear vestibular and visual stimulation in the 
macaque ventral intraparietal area (VIP). Eur. 
J. Neurosci. 16, 1877–1886 (2002).
164. Bremmer, F., Klam, F., Duhamel, J. R., Ben Hamed, S. 
& Graf, W. Visual-vestibular interactive responses in 
the macaque ventral intraparietal area (VIP). Eur. 
J. Neurosci. 16, 1569–1586 (2002).
Important work on the neurophysiology of VIP 
neurons and the integration of visual, vestibular 
and somatosensory cues that are likely to be of 
relevance for self-identification, self-location and 
the first-person perspective.
165. Bremmer, F., Kubischik, M., Pekel, M., Lappe, M. & 
Hoffmann, K. P. Linear vestibular self-motion signals in 
monkey medial superior temporal area. Ann. NY Acad. 
Sci. 871, 272–281 (1999).
R E V I E W S
570 | ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION  www.nature.com/reviews/neuro
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
166. Fetsch, C. R., Wang, S., Gu, Y., Deangelis, G. C. & 
Angelaki, D. E. Spatial reference frames of visual, 
vestibular, and multimodal heading signals in the 
dorsal subdivision of the medial superior temporal 
area. J. Neurosci. 27, 700–712 (2007).
167. Gu, Y., Angelaki, D. E. & Deangelis, G. C. Neural 
correlates of multisensory cue integration in  
macaque MSTd. Nature Neurosci. 11, 1201–1210 
(2008).
168. Gu, Y., DeAngelis, G. C. & Angelaki, D. E. A functional 
link between area MSTd and heading perception 
based on vestibular signals. Nature Neurosci. 10, 
1038–1047 (2007).
169. MacNeilage, P. R., Banks, M. S., Berger, D. R. & 
Bulthoff, H. H. A. Bayesian model of the 
disambiguation of gravitoinertial force by visual cues. 
Exp. Brain Res. 179, 263–290 (2007).
170. Metzinger, T. Being No One (MIT Press, 2003).
171. Craig, A. D. How do you feel — now? The anterior 
insula and human awareness. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 
10, 59–70 (2009).
172. Damasio, A. & Meyer, D. E. in The Neurology of 
Consciousness (eds Laureys, S. & Tononi, G.) 3–14 
(Elsevier, 2009).
173. Damasio, A. R. The Feeling of What Happens: Body 
and Emotion in the Making of Consciousness 
(Harcourt Brace, 1999).
174. Pacherie, E. The phenomenology of action: a 
conceptual framework. Cognition 107, 179–217 
(2008).
175. Tsakiris, M., Tajadura-Jimenez, A. & Costantini, M. 
Just a heartbeat away from one’s body: interoceptive 
sensitivity predicts malleability of body-representations. 
Proc. Biol. Sci. 278, 2470–2476 (2011).
176. Fox, M. D. & Raichle, M. E. Spontaneous fluctuations 
in brain activity observed with functional magnetic 
resonance imaging. Nature Rev. Neurosci. 8,  
700–711 (2007).
177. Greicius, M. D., Supekar, K., Menon, V. & Dougherty, 
R. F. Resting-state functional connectivity reflects 
structural connectivity in the default mode network. 
Cereb. Cortex 19, 72–78 (2009).
178. Golland, Y. et al. Extrinsic and intrinsic systems in the 
posterior cortex of the human brain revealed during 
natural sensory stimulation. Cereb. Cortex 17,  
766–777 (2007).
179. Crick, F. & Koch, C. Some reflections on visual 
awareness. Cold Spring Harb. Symp. Quant. Biol. 55, 
953–962 (1990).
180. Weiskrantz, L. Consciousness Lost and Found (Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1997).
181. Dehaene, S. & Changeux, J. P. Experimental and 
theoretical approaches to conscious processing. 
Neuron 70, 200–227 (2011).
182. Edelman, G. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire (Basic Books, 
1992).
183. Esslen, M., Metzler, S., Pascual-Marqui, R. &  
Jancke, L. Pre-reflective and reflective self-reference: a 
spatiotemporal EEG analysis. Neuroimage 42,  
437–449 (2008).
184. Gillihan, S. J. & Farah, M. J. Is self special? A critical 
review of evidence from experimental psychology and 
cognitive neuroscience. Psychol. Bull. 131, 76–97 
(2005).
185. Heatherton, T. F. et al. Medial prefrontal activity 
differentiates self from close others. Soc. Cogn. Affect 
Neurosci. 1, 18–25 (2006).
186. Legrand, D. & Ruby, P. What is self-specific? 
Theoretical investigation and critical review of 
neuroimaging results. Psychol. Rev. 116, 252–282 
(2009).
187. Macrae, C. N., Moran, J. M., Heatherton, T. F., 
Banfield, J. F. & Kelley, W. M. Medial prefrontal 
activity predicts memory for self. Cereb. Cortex 14, 
647–654 (2004).
188. Northoff, G. et al. Self-referential processing in our 
brain — a meta-analysis of imaging studies on the self. 
Neuroimage 31, 440–457 (2006).
189. Perrin, F. et al. Neural mechanisms involved in the 
detection of our first name: a combined ERPs  
and PET study. Neuropsychologia 43, 12–19  
(2005).
190. Platek, S. M. et al. Neural substrates for functionally 
discriminating self-face from personally familiar faces. 
Hum. Brain Mapp. 27, 91–98 (2006).
191. Gazzaniga, M. S., LeDoux, J. E. & Wilson, D. H. 
Language, praxis, and the right hemisphere: clues to 
some mechanisms of consciousness. Neurology 27, 
1144–1147 (1977).
192. Arzy, S., Arzouan, Y., Adi-Japha, E., Solomon, S. & 
Blanke, O. The ‘intrinsic’ system in the human cortex 
and self-projection: a data driven analysis. 
Neuroreport 21, 569–574 (2010).
193. Arzy, S., Bick, A. & Blanke, O. Mental time in amnesia: 
evidence from bilateral medial temporal damage 
before and after recovery. Cogn. Neuropsychol. 26, 
503–510 (2009).
194. Saxe, R., Moran, J. M., Scholz, J. & Gabrieli, J. 
Overlapping and non-overlapping brain regions for 
theory of mind and self reflection in individual 
subjects. Soc. Cogn. Affect Neurosci. 1, 229–234 
(2006).
195. Moore, J. W., Lagnado, D., Deal, D. C. & Haggard, P. 
Feelings of control: contingency determines 
experience of action. Cognition 110, 279–283 
(2009).
196. Herbelin, B. Virtual Reality Exposure Therapy for 
Social Phobia. Thesis, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de 
Lausanne (2005).
197. Klinger, E. et al. Virtual reality therapy versus cognitive 
behavior therapy for social phobia: a preliminary 
controlled study. Cyberpsychol. Behav. 8, 76–88 
(2005).
198. Moseley, G. L., Gallace, A. & Spence, C. Space-based, 
but not arm-based, shift in tactile processing in 
complex regional pain syndrome and its relationship 
to cooling of the affected limb. Brain 132,  
3142–3151 (2009).
199. Barnsley, N. et al. The rubber hand illusion increases 
histamine reactivity in the real arm. Curr. Biol. 21, 
R945–R946 (2011).
200. Ehrsson, H. H. et al. Upper limb amputees can be 
induced to experience a rubber hand as their own. 
Brain 131, 3443–3452 (2008).
201. Marasco, P. D., Kim, K., Colgate, J. E., Peshkin, M. A. 
& Kuiken, T. A. Robotic touch shifts perception of 
embodiment to a prosthesis in targeted reinnervation 
amputees. Brain 134, 747–758 (2011).
202. Blanke, O. & Aspell, J. E. Brain technologies raise 
unprecedented ethical challenges. Nature 458, 703 
(2009).
203. Hochberg, L. R. et al. Neuronal ensemble control of 
prosthetic devices by a human with tetraplegia. 
Nature 442, 164–171 (2006).
204. Nicolelis, M. Beyond Boundaries. The Neuroscience of 
Connecting Brains with Machines and How It will 
Change our Lives (Times Books, 2011).
205. Perez-Marcos, D., Slater, M. & Sanchez-Vives, M. V. 
Inducing a virtual hand ownership illusion through a 
brain-computer interface. Neuroreport 20, 589–594 
(2009).
206. Creem, S. H. et al. An fMRI study of imagined self-
rotation. Cogn. Affect Behav. Neurosci. 1, 239–249 
(2001).
207. Wraga, M., Shephard, J. M., Church, J. A., Inati, S. & 
Kosslyn, S. M. Imagined rotations of self versus 
objects: an fMRI study. Neuropsychologia 43,  
1351–1361 (2005).
208. Aichhorn, M., Perner, J., Kronbichler, M., Staffen, W. 
& Ladurner, G. Do visual perspective tasks need 
theory of mind? Neuroimage 30, 1059–1068  
(2006).
209. Zacks, J., Rypma, B., Gabrieli, J. D., Tversky, B. & 
Glover, G. H. Imagined transformations of bodies: an 
fMRI investigation. Neuropsychologia 37,  
1029–1040 (1999).
210. Schwabe, L., Lenggenhager, B. & Blanke, O. The timing 
of temporoparietal and frontal activations during 
mental own body transformations from different 
visuospatial perspectives. Hum. Brain Mapp. 30, 
1801–1812 (2009).
211. Amorim, M. A. & Stucchi, N. Viewer- and object-
centered mental explorations of an imagined 
environment are not equivalent. Brain Res. Cogn. 
Brain Res. 5, 229–239 (1997).
212. Wang, R. F. & Simons, D. J. Active and passive scene 
recognition across views. Cognition 70, 191–210  
(1999).
213. Clement, G., Moore, S. T., Raphan, T. & Cohen, B. 
Perception of tilt (somatogravic illusion) in response to 
sustained linear acceleration during space flight. Exp. 
Brain Res. 138, 410–418 (2001).
214. Iriki, A., Tanaka, M., Obayashi, S. & Iwamura, Y. Self-
images in the video monitor coded by monkey 
intraparietal neurons. Neurosci. Res. 40, 163–173 
(2001).
Acknowledgements
The author thanks C. Pfeiffer for his valuable help on the 
manuscript. The author is supported by grants from the Swiss 
National Science Foundation (SINERGIA CRSII1-125135), the 
European Science Foundation (FP7 project VERE) and the 
Bertarelli Foundation.
Competing interests statement
The author declares no competing financial interests.
FURTHER INFORMATION
Olaf Blanke’s homepage: http://cnp.epfl.ch
ALL LINKS ARE ACTIVE IN THE ONLINE PDF
R E V I E W S
NATURE REVIEWS | NEUROSCIENCE  ADVANCE ONLINE PUBLICATION | 571
© 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved
